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Con gress has long stru ggl ed with the issue of m on ey and po l i ti c s .
Proposals for campaign finance reform are essen ti a lly based on the 
bel i ef that po l i tical influ en ce can be bo u ght with financial don a ti ons to a
c a n d i d a te’s campaign . In an ef fort to el i m i n a te this influ en ce , Con gre s s
has con s i dered proposals aimed at limiting the influ en ce that mon ey can
buy. But do con tri buti ons re a lly influ en ce the dec i s i ons of l egi s l a tors on ce
t h ey are in of f i ce? In this policy bri ef , Ch ri s toph er Ma gee of t h e
E con omics Program at Ba rd Co ll ege examines the link bet ween campaign
don a ti ons and legi s l a tors’acti on s .
Two re a s ons are gen era lly given for campaign con tri buti ons to candidate s
f rom po l i tical acti on com m i t tees (PAC s ) .One is that the con tri buti ons are
i n ten ded to influ en ce the acti ons taken by winning candidates on ce they
a re in of f i ce . The other is that they are inten ded to affect the outcome of
an el ecti on . Ma gee examines these two ex p l a n a ti ons by esti m a ting the
ef fect of c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons received by candidates on the outcom e s
of the 1996 el ecti ons to the U. S . House of Repre s en t a tive s . He uses a
Co n gressional Quarterly su rvey of c a n d i d a te s’ policy po s i ti ons to deter-
mine the impact of con tri buti ons on the policy stances adopted by them .
Ma gee’s re sults su ggest that po l i tical acti on com m i t tees don a te campaign
funds to ch a ll en gers in order to affect the outcome of the el ecti on by
i n c reasing the ch a ll en gers’ ch a n ces of wi n n i n g. Ca m p a i gn con tri buti on s
received by ch a ll en gers have a large impact on the el ecti on outcome but
do not seem to affect the ch a ll en gers’ policy stance s . In con tra s t , c a m p a i gn
con tri buti ons to incumbents do not increase their ch a n ces of bei n g
reel ected and seem to be given with the hope of gaining influ en ce .Ma gee’s
re s e a rch indicates that PAC con tri buti ons to incumbents may be given
Pref acepri m a ri ly to sec u re servi ces that el ected officials can provi de ,su ch as influ-
encing the legi s l a tive agen d a , ra t h er than to affect the candidate’s po l i c y
s t a n ce .
As Ma gee indicate s , his findings have some important implicati ons wi t h
rega rd to proposals for campaign finance reform . F i rs t , t h ey indicate that
l i m i ting spending in el ecti on outcomes to a spec i f i ed amount of p u bl i c
funding could ben efit incumbents and hu rt ch a ll en gers . Secon d , reform s
that el i m i n a te PAC con tri buti ons wi t h o ut rep l acing them with publ i c
funding would have little impact on el ecti on outcom e s , but su ch reform s
m i ght affect the policies that em er ge from Con gre s s .
Ma gee notes that his findings are not def i n i tive and that more re s e a rch
n eeds to be done to eva lu a te the ef fects of c a m p a i gn finance reform pro-
po s a l s . However, con s i dering that Con gress is likely to con ti nue its ef fort s
to rem ove the link bet ween mon ey and po l i ti c s , Ma gee’s findings are
i m port a n t . The work that is pre s en ted here con tri butes to an unders t a n d-
ing of the real impact of these propo s ed reform s . As alw ays , I invi te yo u r
com m en t s .
Di m i tri B.Pa p ad i m i tri o u ,Pre s i d en t
June 2001
Public Policy Brief 67 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
The most vi s i ble of the current proposals for campaign finance reform is
the Mc Ca i n - Fei n go l d - Coch ran bi ll . In its current dra f t , the bi ll would ban
s oft mon ey con tri buti on s ,i n c rease the amount that indivi duals and po l i ti-
cal acti on com m i t tees (PACs) can con tri bute direct ly to parti e s , and limit
advertising by labor unions and corpora ti ons on el ecti on issues near the
time of the el ecti on s .1 The bi ll has come a long way from its ori ginal 
vers i on , wh i ch inclu ded vo lu n t a ry spending limits and a ban on PAC 
con tri buti on s . The redu ced ambi ti on of the reform proposal ref l ects the
d i f f i c u l ty of passing campaign finance reform thro u gh an even ly divi ded
House and Sen a te , m a ny of whose mem bers bel i eve that their po l i ti c a l
c a reers may be thre a ten ed by limitati ons on the way their campaigns are
f u n ded . These difficulties are so profo u n d , in fact , that Con gress has
a pproved no major campaign finance reform since 1974.
Most propo s ed reforms of the campaign finance sys tem seek to redu ce leg-
i s l a tors’depen den ce on interest gro u p s .As Levitt (1995) points out ,reform
proposals focus on three issu e s : limits on candidate spen d i n g, limits on
con tri buti on s , and public funding for campaign s .The ef fects of these pro-
posals depend cri ti c a lly on the fo ll owing qu e s ti on s : How ef fective is cam-
p a i gn mon ey spent by ch a ll en gers and incumbents in deciding el ecti on s ?
And do campaign con tri buti ons influ en ce legi s l a tors’activi ties in of f i ce ?
While the litera tu re on each of these qu e s ti ons is ex ten s ive , clear answers
h ave not yet em er ged , and indeed , the re sults to date have left som et h i n g
of a puzzle. Ma ny papers , su ch as Jacob s en (1978, 1 9 8 5 ) , Wel ch (1981),
and Abra m owitz (1988), h ave found that con tri buti ons to incumben t s
h ave little ef fect on the outcome of the el ecti on .The influ en ce of con tri bu-
ti ons on legi s l a tors’ vo ting beh avi or is of ten found to be minimal as well ,
p a rti c u l a rly on issues that are ideo l ogical (Po t ters and Sl oof ,1 9 9 6 ; Bron a rs
and Lo t t ,1 9 9 7 ) .
Ca m p a i gn Con tri buti on s , Po l i c y
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De s p i te these re s e a rch ers’ con clu s i ons that con tri buti ons to incumben t s
h ave very small ef fects on their policy ch oi ces and on el ecti on outcom e s ,
po l i tical acti on com m i t tees have ste ad i ly incre a s ed their con tri buti ons to
House and Sen a te incumbents in the past 15 ye a rs ,as Figure 1 shows .Over
the same time peri od , h owever, t h ere has been no clear trend in PAC con-
tri buti ons to open-seat candidates or to ch a ll en gers . Po l i tical acti on com-
m i t tees gave $20 mill i on to ch a ll en gers and $24 mill i on to open - s e a t
c a n d i d a tes in 1985–86. In 1997–98, those con tri buti ons had incre a s ed to
on ly $22 mill i on and $27 mill i on , re s pectively. While the real va lue of PAC
con tri buti ons to incumbents rose by over 19 percent from 1985 to 1998,
the real va lue of con tri buti ons to ch a ll en gers and open-seat candidates fell
by 26 percent and 24 percen t , re s pectively.If con tri buti ons on ly affect el ec-
ti ons wh en given to ch a ll en gers or open-seat candidates and do not affect
i n c u m ben t s’ policy acti ons or el ecti on outcom e s , as mu ch of the trad i-
ti onal litera tu re has argued ,this beh avi or is puzzling.
Figure 1  PAC Con tri buti on s
This policy bri ef pre s ents em p i rical evi den ce of the ef fect of c a m p a i gn
con tri buti ons and ex pen d i tu res on candidate s’ policy ch oi ces and el ec-
ti on outcom e s , and it discusses the implicati ons of the re sults for cam-
p a i gn finance reform propo s a l s .2 In examining the link bet ween
con tri buti ons and policy ch oi ce s , f ive major policy issues are stu d i ed : t h e
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E l ec ti on Cycl eMedical Le ave Act (FMLA ) , a ban on parti a l - bi rth aborti on s , c uts in the
B-2 bom ber progra m , and gun con tro l . The re sults su pport previ o u s
re s e a rch ers’ con clu s i ons that con tri buti ons affect policy dec i s i ons on ly for
a limited set of i s su e s — pri m a ri ly those in wh i ch the costs or ben efits are
con cen tra ted on an interest group and the issue is less publ i cly vi s i bl e
( Po t ters and Sl oof , 1 9 9 6 ) . The em p i rical re sults also su ggest that campaign
ex pen d i tu res by incumbents do not have large ef fects on el ecti on out-
com e s . Thu s , the puzzle abo ut PAC con tri buti ons to incumbents rem a i n s .
One ex p l a n a ti on con s i s tent with the evi den ce is that PAC mon ey to
i n c u m bents buys unob s erva ble servi ce s , su ch as rewri ting of l egi s l a ti on
and ra llying su pport or oppo s i ti on to bi lls among other repre s en t a tive s .
The data in this stu dy show that con tri buti ons flow more re ad i ly to
i n c u m bents wh o, because they are con gre s s i onal leaders or mem bers of
i n f lu en tial com m i t tee s , a re able to provi de these agen d a - devel opm ent ser-
vi ces to the interest gro u p. This con clu s i on is con s i s tent with re sults in
Ha ll and Wayman (1990), wh i ch find that campaign mon ey en co u ra ged
House com m i t tee mem bers to ex pend more time and ef fort on po l i c y
i s sues important to the con tri buting PAC s .
One adva n t a ge of this paper is that the data inclu de inform a ti on on bo t h
i n c u m bent and ch a ll en gers’ policy po s i ti on s . Most previous re s e a rch
ex a m i n ed the impact of con tri buti ons on policy ch oi ces made by legi s l a-
tors in of f i ce and ign ored the sel ecti on issue of i n cluding in the data set
on ly candidates who won their el ecti on . Because they contain both candi-
d a te s’ policy po s i ti on s , the data here all ow us to inve s ti ga te wh et h er inter-
est groups target their con tri buti ons to races in wh i ch the candidates have
opposing policy stance s . Su ch a stra tegy would be ra ti onal if the PAC
w a n ted to influ en ce the el ecti on in favor of the candidate who su pported
its preferred po s i ti on .
If po l i tical acti on com m i t tees beh ave ra ti on a lly in giving campaign con tri-
buti ons (and Stra tmann [1992] pre s ents evi den ce that PACs are ra ti on a l ) ,
t h ey must be motiva ted by a de s i re to influ en ce ei t h er the outcomes of t h e
el ecti ons or the acti ons of l egi s l a tors . Grossman and Hel pman (1996) refer
to the form er re a s on as an el ectoral motive and the latter as an influ en ce
m o tive for campaign con tri buti on s .S t a ted another way,a PAC can manip-
u l a te govern m ent policies by buying ei t h er legi s l a tors’ policy po s i ti ons or
the el ecti on s .In the latter case,i n terest groups attem pt to sway el ecti ons in
f avor of c a n d i d a tes whose vi ews are most in line with their own .
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The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9Bron a rs and Lott (1997) and Stra tmann (1998) have stu d i ed the po s s i bl e
ef fect of c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons on el ecti on outcomes or legi s l a tor po l i c y
po s i ti on s . Bron a rs and Lott find that de s p i te a large decline in con tri bu-
ti ons received du ring their last el ecti on cycl e , reti ring legi s l a tors do not
ch a n ge their vo ting pattern s . The aut h ors interpret this evi den ce to mean
that PAC con tri buti ons do not ch a n ge po l i ti c i a n s’ beh avi or. Fu rt h er evi-
den ce that campaign con tri buti ons are given with an el ectoral motive
comes from intervi ews of 20 major po l i tical acti on com m i t tee s , wh i ch
cl a i m ed that they almost never gave to both candidates in the same el ec-
ti on .Poole and Rom er (1985) also note this last re su l t .
S tra tmann finds that farm PACs incre a s ed the nu m ber and amount of
wee k ly con tri buti ons around the time of f a rm su b s i dy vo tes in Con gress as
well as near the pri m a ry and gen eral el ecti on s . He con clu des that farm
PACs give campaign mon ey to affect both el ecti ons and legi s l a tor beh avi or.
Wel ch (1980) also finds evi den ce that interest groups don a ted more mon ey
to likely wi n n ers than they did to candidates in close race s . He points out
that this pattern of con tri buti ons is incon s i s tent with interest groups havi n g
on ly an el ectoral motive for givi n g. Snyder (1992) su ggests that the ten-
dency of PACs to don a te heavi ly to sen i or incumbents who face little el ec-
toral oppo s i ti on is “not so con s i s tent with a ch a ri t a ble motive for givi n g.”
S tu dying the ef fect of con tri buti ons on legi s l a tor vo ting beh avi or is com p l i-
c a ted by the fact that campaign con tri buti ons are en dogen o u s ,meaning that
i n terest groups may give don a ti ons to candidates who would su pport the
gro u p’s po s i ti on even in the absen ce of the con tri buti on . Ch a ppell (1982)
finds that wh en he con trols for their en dogen ei ty, c a m p a i gn con tri buti on s
do not sign i f i c a n t ly affect legi s l a tive vo ting in any of the seven issues he
ex a m i n e s . S tra tmann (1991), h owever, uses the same em p i rical met h od to
s h ow that con tri buti ons sign i f i c a n t ly affect legi s l a tors’ vo tes on ei ght out of
ten agri c u l tu ral policy bi lls analy zed . Ba l dwin and Ma gee (2000b) find that
con tri buti ons from business and labor groups affected repre s en t a tive s’
vo ting on NA F TA and the GATT Uru g u ay Round Agreem en t .
De s p i te these instances in wh i ch mon ey affects vo ting beh avi or, Ben der
and Lott (1996), in a revi ew of the litera tu re , con clu de that po l i ticians vo te
in their con s ti tu en t s’ i n terests in “the vast majori ty of c a s e s .” Th ey argue
that wh en campaign con tri buti ons do affect legi s l a tors’ vo ting beh avi or,
the devi a ti on bet ween the repre s en t a tive s’ acti ons and their con s ti tu en c y
C a m pa i gn Co n tri bu ti o n s , Policy De ci s i o n s ,and Election Ou tco m e s
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i n terests is not large . Morton and Ca m eron (1992) su ggest that campaign
m on ey is more likely to affect legi s l a tors’ beh avi or wh en the econ om i c
ef fects of the bi lls under con s i dera ti on are con cen tra ted on parti c u l a r
i n terest groups and wh en the issues are less publ i cly vi s i bl e .
The ef fect of c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons on el ecti on outcomes is also som e-
what in dispute . The “e a rly em p i rical evi den ce ,” according to Morton and
Ca m eron (1992), and the “conven ti onal wi s dom ,” according to Levi t t
( 1 9 9 5 ) , a re that el ecti on spending by ch a ll en gers has a large impact on
el ecti on outcom e s , but that spending by incumbents is rel a tively unpro-
du ctive . This vi ew was initi a lly argued by Jacob s on (1978, 1985) and su p-
ported by Abra m owitz (1988).
Green and Krasno (1988), Levitt (1994), and Eri k s on and Pa l f rey (1998,
2000) disagree with the vi ew that ch a ll en ger spending affects el ecti on
o utcomes more than incumbent spen d i n g. Green and Krasno find that
i n c u m bent spending has a gre a ter ef fect on el ecti on outcomes wh en a
n ew measu re of ch a ll en ger po l i tical qu a l i ty is inclu ded in the regre s-
s i on s . In c u m bent spending also appe a rs to have a significant ef fect on
vo te outcomes for fre s h m en incumbents (Eri k s on and Pa l f rey, 1 9 9 8 )
and in races that are ex pected to be close (Eri k s on and Pa l f rey, 2 0 0 0 ) .
Levitt finds that spending by ch a ll en gers and incumbents has a similar,
very small impact on the el ecti on re sults in repe a ted races bet ween the
same two candidate s .
E mpiric al Model
To examine this issu e , a mu l ti p l e - equ a ti on em p i rical model was devel-
oped . It esti m a tes the prob a bi l i ty that a candidate wi ll win an el ecti on , t h e
con tri buti ons candidates receive , and the policy ch oi ces they make . An
el ecti on outcome is assu m ed to be a functi on of the pers onal ch a racteri s-
tics of t wo candidates and the total campaign con tri buti ons that each has
ava i l a bl e . Si n ce don ors give campaign funds to candidates who are more
l i kely to wi n , and candidates seek more mon ey if t h ey are invo lved in a
close race ,con tri buti ons must be tre a ted as en dogen o u s .
F i g u re 2 reveals the en dogenous natu re of con tri buti ons by plotting avera ge
c a m p a i gn recei pts against the margin of vi ctory for candidates in open - s e a tC a m pa i gn Co n tri bu ti o n s ,Policy De ci s i o n s , and Election Ou tco m e s
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race s , for ch a ll en gers facing incumben t s , and for incumben t s . The 
f i g u re shows a decline in the total con tri buti ons received by incumben t s
and by open-seat candidates as their margin of vi ctory ri s e s . O n ly on e
i n c u m bent lost (and one ch a ll en ger defe a ted him) by more than 
20 percen t a ge poi n t s . The fact that campaign recei pts rise for su cce s s f u l
ch a ll en gers cannot reveal if m on ey influ en ces an el ecti on or if su cce s s f u l
c a n d i d a tes attract more mon ey.
Figure 2  Ca m p a i gn Con tri buti ons and Ma rgin ofVi c tory
A sys tem of equ a ti ons was used to sep a ra te the actual ef fect of con tri bu-
ti ons on el ecti on outcomes from the ef fect that these con tri buti ons were
ex pected to have on outcom e s . ( For a det a i l ed de s c ri pti on of the model
and the met h ods used , s ee Appendix A ) . Factors in the first stage of t h e
m odel inclu ded campaign con tri buti ons received by candidates (sep a ra ted
bet ween Rep u blican and Dem oc ra tic candidate s ) , the ex pected percen t a ge
of the popular vo te received by each candidate (aga i n , s ep a ra ted by party
a f f i l i a ti on ) ,wh et h er the candidate was an incumben t ,and other exogen o u s
ex p l a n a tory va ri a bl e s . From the model , e s ti m a tes were derived for the
ef fects of recei pts by an incumben t , ch a ll en ger, or open-seat candidate on
el ecti on outcomes for each party affiliati on . Also gl e a n ed from the esti-
m a tes are how campaign recei pts re s pond to ex pected vo ting outcom e s
and the ex tent to wh i ch the candidates alter their fund-raising in re s pon s e
to the con tri buti ons ra i s ed by their oppon en t .
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The second stage of the model esti m a ted the ef fects of c a m p a i gn con tri-
buti ons on the policy dec i s i ons made by candidate s . Ca n d i d a tes are
a s su m ed to adopt policy stances based on pers onal tra i t s , ch a racteri s ti c s
of t h eir con gre s s i onal distri ct s , and campaign con tri buti ons given by
groups who su pport or oppose each bi ll . (The policy ch oi ces are
de s c ri bed in more detail bel ow.) PAC con tri buti ons are assu m ed to be
en dogenous because interest groups want to help el ect candidates wh o
a re pred i s po s ed to su pport the com m i t tee’s preferred po s i ti on . In clu ded
in this stage of the model are con tri buti ons that a candidate receive s
f rom groups who su pport or oppose a given po l i c y, and the policy dec i-
s i on of the opposing candidate . From these esti m a tes we can see the
ef fects of c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons on the policy stances adopted by
i n c u m bents and ch a ll en gers .
F ive policy ch oi ces are ex a m i n ed in this paper. The first is the Nort h
Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent (NA F TA ) , wh i ch el i m i n a ted trade barri-
ers among the Un i ted State s , Ca n ad a , and Mex i co. O r ga n i zed labor
s tron gly oppo s ed NA F TA while business groups gen era lly su pported it.
Ba l dwin and Ma gee (2000b) pre s ent evi den ce that campaign con tri bu-
ti ons from labor groups were assoc i a ted with vo tes against the 1993
NA F TA bi ll while business group con tri buti ons were correl a ted with vo te s
in favor of i t . The Fa m i ly and Medical Le ave Act (FMLA ) , requ i ring bu s i-
nesses to provi de leave for workers who have a medical em er gen c y, give
bi rt h , or adopt a ch i l d , is the second policy issue ex a m i n ed . L a bor gro u p s
a re assu m ed to oppose NA F TA and su pport the FMLA while bu s i n e s s
groups su pport NA F TA and oppose the FMLA .
A third policy issue ex a m i n ed is a bi ll proposing a ban on parti a l - bi rt h
a borti on s . In terest groups iden ti f i ed as pro - l i fe are assu m ed to su pport
the bill while pro-choice groups oppose it. The final policy positions ana-
lyzed are proposals to cut spending for B-2 bombers and the Brady bill
restricting sales of handguns.Defense aerodynamics political action com-
mittees (identified by the Center for Responsive Politics) are assumed to
oppose the former proposal while interest groups advocating a reduction
in military spending support it. Handgun control groups are assumed to
su pport the Brady bi ll while the Na ti onal Rifle As s oc i a ti on (NRA) and
o t h er gun ri ghts groups oppose it. The data used in this stu dy are
described in the tables.E mpiric al Results
Ca m p a i gn con tri buti ons and el ec ti on outcom e s
The first qu e s ti on to ad d ress is what ef fect campaign con tri buti on s
received by candidates have on election outcomes. This issue is particu-
larly important in evaluating the impact of campaign finance reform pro-
posals on el ecti on prob a bi l i ties for ch a ll en gers and incumben t s . Ta ble 1
presents the results of estimates from the first round of the model. The
s econd co lumn in the upper porti on of the table pre s ents the margi n a l
effect of a unit change in the listed variable on the percen t a ge of vo te s
received by the Dem oc ra t . The marginal ef fects are calculated rel a tive
to the vo te fracti on that an otherwise avera ge Dem oc rat would receive .
These baseline vo te fracti ons are listed at the bo t tom of the tabl e .
Table 1 Estimates of Effects from the First Model
A.Election Outcome Equation
Democrat Vote  Single Equation
Fraction Estimates _______________________
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effects
Contributions
Incumbent (D) -0.00004- 0.00143 -0.00003
Challenger (D) 0.00026*** 0.00996 0.00027 ***
Open Seat (D) 0.00015* 0.00589 0.00012 *
Incumbent (R) -0.00002 -0.00060 -0.00002
Challenger (R) -0.00029*** -0.01104 -0.00036 ***
Open Seat (R) -0.00020*** -0.00806 -0.00022 ***
Instrumental variables
Presidential vote 0.00772*** 0.30806 0.00766 ***
Other variables
No high school degree 0.00309** 0.12317 0.00292 **
Per capita income -0.00174 -0.06949 O,E       -0.00125
Office (D) – Office (R) 0.05536*** 2.20612 0.06320 ***
Nominee (D) – Nominee (R) 0.02709 1.08036 0.03702
Terms (D) – Terms (R) 0.00520** 0.20750 0.00416 *
Incumbent (D) – Incumbent (R) 0.26560*** 10.44897 0.27084 ***
Constant -0.06541 -0.05494
R-squared 0.9008 0.8890
Ba s eline vo te fracti on (incumben t ) 0.6335
Ba s eline vo te fracti on (ch a ll en ger ) 0.4000
Baseline vote fraction (open seat)  0.5065
C a m pa i gn Co n tri bu ti o n s , Policy De ci s i o n s , and Election Ou tco m e s
Public Policy Brief 14B.Contribution Equations
Democratic Receipts Republican Receipts
Variables Coefficients Coefficients
Democrat fraction of vote 1150.79 *** 116.75 O,E
Vote fraction * Close race -25.39 O 599.07 ***
Opponent contributions 0.34 *** 0.10
Instrumental variables
Northeast 72.91 6.91
South 66.78 159.20 ***
West 40.58 -12.98
Age -4.16 -5.16 **
Primary 123.13 *** 84.32 *
1994 receipts 0.95 *** 0.89 ***
Committee chair -14.61 182.36 **
Ways and Means Committee -59.51 O 48.71 E
Other variables
No high school degree -6.18 * -10.10 ***
Per capita income -5.16 -2.46
Office 116.22 ** 145.16 **
Nominee -35.37 39.61 O
Terms 7.31 O 0.64 O
Incumbent -377.72 *** -186.57 *
Constant -14.29 O 514.04 **
R-squared 0.5979 0.6047
Observations 412 412
Log likelihood -5303 -5303
O, E indicate that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to excluding outliers or to the estimation method.
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent,and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
These results indicate that contributions received by incumbents do not
a f fect el ecti on outcomes because the coef f i c i ents on Dem oc ra tic and
Rep u blican incumbent con tri buti ons (co lumn 2) are both stati s ti c a lly
and economically insignificant. The estimates indicate, for example, that
$100,000 of extra spending by a Republican incumbent would lower the
Democratic challenger’s share of the vote by only 0.06 percentage points.
The sign on the Dem oc rat incumbent con tri buti on va ri a ble is actu a lly
negative, suggesting that the Democrat’s vote share falls as his or her con-
tributions increase. Whether this coefficient is positive or negative, how-
ever, is sensitive to the estimation technique used.3 The small, and even
s om etimes nega tive , ef fects of i n c u m bent spending are con s i s tent wi t h
the estimates in Jacobson (1978, 1985) and Abramowitz (1988). The coef-
ficient estimates on the incumbent contribution variables are significantly
d i f ferent from the coef f i c i ent esti m a tes on the ch a ll en ger con tri buti on
variables at the 1 percent level and different from the coefficients on the
open-seat con tri buti on va ri a bles at the 5 percent level . Con tri buti on s
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received by Democrats appear to have the same impact on the election as
contributions received by Republicans. The coefficients on the contribu-
ti on va ri a bles do not differ sign i f i c a n t ly in magn i tu de bet ween
Democrats and Republicans.4
Un l i ke con tri buti ons to incumben t s , c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons received by
ch a ll en gers and open-seat candidates do have a stati s ti c a lly significant ef fect
on the 1996 House el ecti on outcom e s . An ex tra $100,000 in con tri buti on s
received by Rep u blican ch a ll en gers and open-seat candidates lowers the
Dem oc ra t’s vo te share by 1.1 and 0.8  percen t a ge poi n t s , re s pectively. Th e
same increase in con tri buti ons to Dem oc ra tic ch a ll en gers and open - s e a t
c a n d i d a tes raises that vo te share by 1 and 0.6  percen t a ge poi n t s .These esti-
m a tes are small er than the impact of ch a ll en ger con tri buti ons on el ecti on
o utcomes found in Ma gee (2001). That paper ex a m i n ed on ly races bet ween
i n c u m bents and ch a ll en gers , and it found that $100,000 in ch a ll en ger con-
tri buti ons ra i s ed their vo te share by 2.2 percen t a ge poi n t s , while the ef fect
of i n c u m bent con tri buti ons rem a i n ed negl i gi bl e . The esti m a ted impacts of
ch a ll en ger con tri buti ons on the el ecti on outcomes are not sign i f i c a n t ly dif-
ferent from the ef fect of open-seat con tri buti on s .
Jacob s on (1978) hypo t h e s i zes that the differen ce bet ween the ef fects of
ch a ll en ger and incumbent spending on el ecti on outcomes arose bec a u s e
the purpose of advertising is to gain name recogn i ti on .In c u m bents alre ady
en j oyed name recogn i ti on among their con s ti tu en c i e s , but ch a ll en gers did
n o t . Thu s , ch a ll en gers had more to gain from campaign spending than
i n c u m ben t s , and mon ey ava i l a ble to the form er should have a larger
i m p act on the el ecti on . The re sult found in this stu dy, that con tri buti on s
received by ch a ll en gers and open-seat candidates have similar, l a r ge ef fect s
on el ecti on s ,is con s i s tent with Jacob s on’s hypothesis since both ch a ll en gers
and open-seat candidates lack name recogn i ti on rel a tive to incumben t s .
Because the type of m odels used for these esti m a tes is very sen s i tive to the
a s su m pti ons of the model , a nu m ber of robu s tness tests were perform ed ;
these are inclu ded in Ta ble 1.The esti m a ti on was perform ed excluding out-
l i ers , wh i ch are def i n ed as races in wh i ch the winning candidate ga i n ed
m ore than 90 percent of the vo te or in wh i ch one of the candidate s
received more than $2.4 mill i on . These re s tri cti ons exclu ded 12 race s . Th e
regre s s i ons were also run using altern a tive esti m a ti on procedu res (gen era l-
i zed met h od of m om ents and two - s t a ge least squ a re s ) . Coef f i c i ents wh o s eA Stu dy of the Ef fe cts of C a m pa i gn Fi n a n ce Refo rm
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s i gns reverse wh en out l i ers are exclu ded are marked with O and those that
a re sen s i tive to the esti m a ti on tech n i que are marked E. The last co lumn in
Ta ble 1A pre s ents the re sults of e s ti m a ting the el ecti on outcome as a singl e
equ a ti on , wh i ch treats con tri buti ons as exogen o u s . The coef f i c i ent esti-
m a tes remain very similar in the singl e - equ a ti on regre s s i on .
If po l i tical acti on com m i t tees give mon ey solely for the purpose of i n f lu en c-
ing el ecti on s , t h ey should target their campaign con tri buti ons to candidate s
whose oppon ents have adopted a con tra ry policy po s i ti on .Wh en both can-
d i d a tes hold the same policy stance on an issu e , a con cern ed interest gro u p
has no el ectoral motive to con tri bute . Ta ble 2 inve s ti ga tes wh et h er intere s t
groups give less mon ey in races in wh i ch both major candidates have
adopted the same policy stance .The table shows avera ge con tri buti ons from
i n terest groups that are con cern ed abo ut the particular issue in qu e s ti on .
Table 2 Mean Contributions from Related Interest Groups 
by Type of District
Con tri buti ons to all candidate s NA F TA F M LA Aborti on B-2 Bom ber Bra dy Bi ll
Districts in which candidates   $ 98,803 $ 94,019 $ 1,075 $ 3,540 $ 1,453
have same policy stance
Districts in which candidates 101,735 98,008 1,987 2,547 2,333
have different policy stances
T-statistic for difference 0.269 0.382 2.249* -1.616 1.374
of means 
Contributions to challengers only
Districts in which candidates  39,712 40,580 890 384 550
have same policy stance
Districts in which candidates  31,442 25,290 2,229 414 2,387
have different policy stances
T-statistic for difference of means -1.079 -2.013* 2.517* 0.155 2.053*
* The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Th ere is no evi den ce that interest groups con cern ed with NA F TA , t h e
Fa m i ly and Medical Le ave Act , and defense spending targeted their mon ey
tow a rd races in wh i ch candidates adopted opposing policy stance s . Th e
on ly stati s ti c a lly significant differen ce indicated that labor and bu s i n e s s
groups actu a lly gave less mon ey to ch a ll en gers in races in wh i ch the candi-
d a tes were split on the FMLA than to ch a ll en gers in races in wh i ch the two
c a n d i d a tes agreed on the policy issu e .On the two other issu e s ,a borti on and
gun con tro l , h owever, Ta ble 2 provi des some evi den ce that interest gro u p s
gave more mon ey wh en candidates held opposing policy stance s .C a m pa i gn Co n tri bu ti o n s ,Policy De ci s i o n s , and Election Ou tco m e s
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Snyder (1992) defines “ i nve s tor PAC s” as those “s et up by or ga n i z a ti on s
with rel a tively narrow econ omic intere s t s ,” su ch as corpora ti on s , l a bor
u n i on s , and the defense indu s try. Ideo l ogical PACs have “broad ideo l ogi-
cal goals and a rel a tively strong de s i re to affect el ecti on outcom e s .” Ta bl e
2 pre s ents evi den ce to su pport this categori z a ti on . The el ectoral motive ,
wh i ch pushes interest groups into giving mon ey pri m a ri ly to races in
wh i ch the candidates disagree , is of pri m a ry import a n ce for ideo l ogi c a l
PACs su ch as pro - l i fe , pro - ch oi ce , gun con tro l , and gun ri ghts gro u p s .
The el ectoral motive is swamped by other con s i dera ti ons among the
i nve s tor PACs intere s ted in NA F TA ,the FMLA , and defense spen d i n g.
Ca m p a i gn con tri buti ons and policy po s i ti on s
Ta ble 3 pre s ents the re sults of e s ti m a ting NA F TA and FMLA policy dec i s i on s
and the con tri buti ons received from labor and business gro u p s . The two
i s sues are esti m a ted simu l t a n eo u s ly since both were important to labor 
and bu s i n e s s .
Table 3 NAFTA and FMLA Policy Decisions and Labor and
Business Contributions
A.NAFTA Policy Decision
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Incumbent contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) -0.0006 -0.0247
Challenger contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 0.0159 0.6132
District characteristics
Export ratio 0.2613 * 9.6705
Percentage Hispanic 0.0220 *** 0.8468
Union -0.0247 * -0.9592
Per capita income 0.0180 0.6953
No high school degree -0.0362 *** -1.4057
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B.Family and Medical Leave Act Policy Decision
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Incumbent contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) -0.0031 ** -0.0988
Challenger contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 0.0014 E 0.0451
District characteristics
Union 0.0632 *** 2.0639









E indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the GMM estimation technique.
C.Contribution Equations
Business Contributions Labor Contributions
Variables Coefficients Coefficients
Policy choices
NAFTA 11.8455 -53.3721 ***
NAFTA (opponent) 1.6804 E -2.4772
FMLA -67.8002 *** 71.6803 ***
FMLA (opponent) -9.2766 2.7675
Personal characteristics
Committee chair 38.0351 *** -3.8717 E
Ways and Means Committee 43.0381 *** -------
Commerce 93.1447 *** -------
Small Business 8.0633 E -------
Education and Labor ------- 32.8593 ***
Labor (subcommittee) ------- 21.1688
T erm s 1 . 1 6 3 6 0 . 1 9 8 3 O,E
Incumbent 31.8428 *** -5.2434 O
Office -18.8547 *** 21.3640 ***
Nomination -2.8765 7.3720 *
Democrat 18.7421 11.9712
Total receipts 0.1175 *** 0.0699 ***
Constant 24.9943 * -31.4396 **
R2 0.63 0.43
Observations 384 384
O indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the exclusion of outliers.
E indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the GMM estimation technique.
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent
levels,respectively.Ca m p a i gn con tri buti ons from business and labor groups have no stati s ti-
c a lly significant ef fect on candidate s’ po s i ti ons on NA F TA . The sign of t h e
coef f i c i ent is even nega tive for incumben t s , and the magn i tu des indicate
that a $1,000 increase in business con tri buti ons (rel a tive to labor con tri bu-
ti ons) lowered an incumben t’s likel i h ood of vo ting for NA F TA by on ly
0.02  percen t a ge points and ra i s ed a ch a ll en ger ’s prob a bi l i ty of su pporti n g
NA F TA by 0.6  percen t a ge poi n t s . Rep u blicans from distri cts with ex port -
ori en ted em p l oym en t , a high proporti on of re s i dents wi t h o ut a high
s ch ool degree ,who were largely Hi s p a n i c ,and a weak union pre s en ce were
m ore likely to su pport NA F TA .
Con tri buti ons also do not affect candidate s’ policy stances on the Fa m i ly
and Medical Le ave Act in the ex pected manner. A $1,000 increase in labor
con tri buti ons lowers the prob a bi l i ty of an incumben t’s su pporting the
F M LA by 0.1 percen t a ge point and raises the prob a bi l i ty that a ch a ll en ger
su pports the act by 0.05 percen t a ge poi n t . Thu s , the esti m a ted impacts of
l a bor and business con tri buti ons on both NA F TA and the FMLA are very
s m a ll .Dem oc rats (98 percent of wh om su pported it) from stron gly union-
i zed distri ct s ,p a rti c u l a rly those distri cts that vo ted Dem oc ra tic in the 1996
pre s i den tial el ecti on , were more likely to su pport the FMLA than were
Rep u blicans (29 percent su pport ) .5
The first columns in Table 3C show the factors affecting how much finan-
cial support a candidate receives from business groups and labor groups.
The esti m a tes show that business PACs gave sligh t ly more mon ey
($11,846) and labor PACs gave much less money ($53,372) to candidates
who su pported NA F TA . Me a nwh i l e , l a bor groups gave $71,680 more 
to FMLA su pporters while business groups don a ted $67,800 to FMLA
opponents. An opponent’s policy stance on the bills did not affect a can-
didate’s receipts from labor or business groups.
The results in Table 3C also suggest that PACs gave campaign donations
with an eye toward the agenda-development services that incumbent leg-
islators could provide.Business groups gave about $38,000 more to mem-
bers of the House Ways and Means Committee in 1995–96,$93,000 more
to mem bers of the Com m erce Com m i t tee , and $43,000 more to the
chairs or ranking members of committees. Labor groups raised donations
by $33,000 to mem bers of the Edu c a ti on and Labor Com m i t tee and by
$21,000 to members of the Labor Subcommittee of Appropriations.
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the con tri buti ons from groups intere s ted in this issu e .As with NA F TA and
the FMLA , c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons do not sign i f i c a n t ly affect the po l i c y
s t a n ce adopted by candidates (the coef f i c i ent again has the wrong sign for
i n c u m ben t s ) ,but don a ti ons do flow to candidates who su pport the intere s t
Table 4 Aborti on Policy Dec i s i ons and In terest Group Con tri buti on s
A.Policy Decision 
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Incumbent contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) -0.2328 -7.7470
Challenger contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 0.1477 4.3106
District characteristics
Over 65 4.9102 23.6979
Per capita income -0.0356 -1.1123
Abortions -0.0318 ** -0.9918
Teen births 0.0143 0.4388
Votes for Clinton -0.0391 ** -1.2223
Personal characteristics
Male 1.1025 *** 20.2492
Age -0.0036 O -0.1106
Married 0.2137 6.0740
Catholic 1.0226 *** 19.5933









Abortion bill 1.2272 ** -2.2138 ***
Abortion bill (opponent) -0.1257 0.0841
Personal characteristics
Committee chair 0.4562 -0.3103
Judiciary 0.0974 -0.1583
Terms -0.1109 ** -0.0009 O,E
Incumbent -1.0192 -0.8018 *
Office 0.5427 0.2135
Nomination 0.7808 0.0194 O
Democrat -0.4654 -0.5028
Total receipts 0.0009 ** 0.0018 ***
Constant -0.2288 E 1.5539 ***
R2 0.12 0.19
Observations 538 538
O indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the exclusion of outliers.
E indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the GMM estimation technique.
*, **,*** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent,5 percent, and 1 percent
levels,respectively.
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a borti ons received abo ut $1,227 more from pro - l i fe groups and $2,214 less
f rom pro - ch oi ce PAC s . These differen ces in don a ti ons repre s ent very large
s wi n gs , con s i dering that the avera ge candidate received on ly $1,260 from
pro - l i fe groups and $710 from pro - ch oi ce gro u p s . The aborti on po l i c y
s t a n ce was split largely along party lines, as the very large coef f i c i ent esti-
m a te on the Dem oc rat va ri a ble shows .
Table 5 National Defense Policy Decisions and Interest Group
Contributions
A.Policy Decision
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Incumbent contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 0.0637 *** 2.5356
Challenger contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 3.2287 53.6284
District characteristics
Veterans 0.1439 ** 5.7337
Air Force -0.0654 -2.5873
Military employment -0.0442 *** -1.7514
Votes for Clinton -0.0018 -0.0716
Personal characteristics
Military service -0.3601 ** -13.7703
Male -0.0760 -3.0069









B-2 bomber bill 0.0349 -1.1626
B-2 bomber bill (opponent) 0.0297 -1.2272 *
Personal characteristics
Committee chair -0.0249 1.6333
National Security 0.0195 11.8175 ***
Budget -0.0008 -0.8351
Terms 0.0035 0.3307 **
Incumbent -0.1916 *** 0.6007
Office 0.0294 O -0.4796
Nomination 0.0388 E 0.1547 E
Democrat 0.0932 ** -0.5695
Total receipts 0.0002 *** 0.0039 ***
Constant -0.0797 *** 0.8246
R2 0.10 0.45
Observations 469 469
O indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the exclusion of outliers.
E indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the GMM estimation technique.
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent,and 1 percent
levels,respectively.
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con tri buti ons are pre s en ted in Ta ble 5. Defense spending is the on ly po l i c y
ch oi ce of the five ex a m i n ed here in wh i ch con tri buti ons are esti m a ted to
s w ay candidate s’ vo te s . A $1,000 rise in con tri buti ons received from pe ace
groups rel a tive to the defense lobby ra i s ed an incumben t’s prob a bi l i ty of
vo ting for the redu cti on in defense spending by abo ut 2.5 percen t a ge
poi n t s . The esti m a ted ef fect on ch a ll en gers is mu ch larger, but the coef f i-
c i ent is not esti m a ted very prec i s ely and is not sign i f i c a n t ly different from
zero. The two coef f i c i ents are joi n t ly significant at the 5 percent level .
Fu rt h er evi den ce that defense indu s try PACs have an influ en ce motive is
given by the esti m a te that mem bers of the Na ti onal Sec u ri ty Com m i t tee
receive $11,818 more in campaign con tri buti ons from defense PAC s .Th e s e
t a r geted don a ti ons repre s ent an increase of m ore than four times the aver-
a ge defense lobby con tri buti ons to candidates ($2,650). Ca n d i d a tes (par-
ti c u l a rly Rep u blicans) who had served in the military them s elves and those
f rom distri cts with large military em p l oym ent were also likely to vo te
a gainst redu cti ons in B-2 bom ber spen d i n g.
Un l i ke the other policy issues ex a m i n ed here , con tri buti ons from the
defense lobby and from “dove” groups do not sign i f i c a n t ly re s pond to the
defense spending policy ch oi ce adopted by the candidate s . The point esti-
m a tes indicate that a candidate who su pported the redu cti on of s pen d i n g
on B-2 bom bers received , on avera ge , a bo ut $35 more from pe ace gro u p s
and $1,163 less from defense groups than did an otherwise iden tical defen s e
h awk .The esti m a tes also su ggest that a candidate whose oppon ent su pport s
the bi ll wi ll receive over $1,200 less from defense PAC s .If it were con tri but-
ing with an el ectoral motive , the defense indu s try should have given more
m on ey to candidates whose oppon ents favored reducing military spen d i n g.
The factors affecting candidate s’ dec i s i ons abo ut gun con trol are pre s en ted
in Ta ble 6.As with the NA F TA , F M LA ,and aborti on stance s ,con tri buti on s
do not affect candidate s’ policy dec i s i ons on the Brady bi ll . A $1,000
i n c rease in con tri buti ons from gun con trol groups (rel a tive to gun ri gh t s
groups) means a 3  percen t a ge point increase in the likel i h ood of su pport-
ing the Brady bi ll for incumben t s . As with the defense bi ll , the impact of
con tri buti ons on ch a ll en ger policy ch oi ces is very imprec i s ely esti m a ted .
Wom en , Dem oc ra t s , and candidates from we a l t hy distri cts with large
po l i ce forces are more likely to su pport gun con tro l .
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Contributions
A.Policy Decision
Variables Coefficients Marginal Effect
Incumbent contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 0.0765 3.0489
Challenger contributions (Cjm – C(-j)m) 100.6938 52.7121
District characteristics
Per capita income 0.0878 *** 3.5023
Police 0.0400 * 1.5933
Violent crimes -0.0002 -0.0094
Metropolitan 0.0079 0.3130
Votes for Clinton 0.0101 0.4012
Personal characteristics
Male -0.5142 *** -19.2686
Military service 0.0609 2.4290









Brady bill 0.3449 *** -5.7828 ***
Brady bill (opponent) -0.0206 1.1640 ***
Personal characteristics
Committee chair -0.1219 * -0.8182
Terms -0.0024 -0.2172 **
Incumbent -0.0373 1.3442 E
Office -0.0442 -0.3455 O
Nomination 0.0574 0.5700
Democrat -0.0702 E 1.9832 ***
Total receipts 0.0003 *** 0.0029 ***
Constant -0.1540 *** 1.8723 ***
R2 0.13 0.10
Observations 440 440
O indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the exclusion of outliers.
E indicates that the sign of the coefficient is sensitive to the GMM estimation technique.
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent
levels,respectively.
The coef f i c i ent esti m a tes in Ta ble 6B provi de strong evi den ce that po l i ti c a l
acti on com m i t tees intere s ted in gun con trol issues are giving mon ey pri-
m a ri ly from an el ectoral motive . Con tri buti ons from gun con trol gro u p s
rise by abo ut $345 and don a ti ons from gun ri ghts groups fall by $5,783
wh en a candidate su pports the Brady bi ll . Fu rt h erm ore , con tri buti ons 
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f rom gun ri ghts groups rise by $1,164 if the candidate’s oppon ent su p-
ports the Brady bill. These results are consistent with those in Langbein
(1993), which find that campaign contributions from the NRA and from
handgun control advocates were targeted primarily at extremist support-
ers of the two groups’ positions. Unlike the estimates here, however, she
finds that NRA con tri buti ons influ en ced repre s en t a tive s’ vo ting on gun
issues in 1985.
The re sults in Ta bles 3–6 su ggest that interest groups don a te funds in
re s ponse to candidate s’ policy stances on most issues ra t h er than in an
ef fort to exert influ en ce . Con tri buti ons had a stati s ti c a lly sign i f i c a n t
i m p act on the po s i ti on adopted by incumbents in the ex pected manner for
on ly one out of f ive policies and never sign i f i c a n t ly influ en ced the po s i-
ti ons of ch a ll en gers . For four of the issu e s , h owever, the candidate s’ po l i c y
po s i ti ons sign i f i c a n t ly affected the pattern of con tri buti ons that they
received . Two of the po l i c i e s , gun con trol and aborti on , m i ght re a s on a bly
be con s i dered ideo l ogical issu e s , and the re sult that con tri buti ons from
i n tere s ted PACs do not affect vo ting patterns is con s i s tent with the con clu-
s i ons of e a rl i er studies that ideo l ogical PACs rew a rd legi s l a tors who su p-
port their po s i ti ons ra t h er than influ encing their beh avi or. For on ly on e
propo s a l — to cut B-2 bom ber spen d i n g, for wh i ch con tri buti ons were
cl e a rly an inve s tm ent for the defense indu s try—did campaign don a ti on s
i n f lu en ce policy po s i ti ons ra t h er than re s pond to them . The B-2 bom ber
i s sue may also be re a s on a bly de s c ri bed using the con d i ti ons that Morton
and Ca m eron (1992) su ggest are favora ble for con tri buti ons to influ en ce
l egi s l a tors’ vo te s : ben efits that are con cen tra ted on a narrow group and
redu ced public vi s i bi l i ty.
Except for the defense indu s try, these re sults are gen era lly con s i s tent wi t h
the attem pt by PACs to influ en ce el ecti ons and aid those candidates wh o s e
po s i ti ons are similar to their own .This stra tegy makes sense for ch a ll en gers ,
for wh om con tri buti ons have a large impact on the el ecti on outcom e . It
also makes sense if the PACs are trying to mobi l i ze ef fort on the part of
l i ke - m i n ded incumben t s , as Ha ll and Wayman (1990) su gge s t . One re su l t
i n con s i s tent with an el ectoral motive for giving is that the oppon en t’s po l-
icy stance ra rely affects the candidate s’recei pts from an interest gro u p.O n ly
gun ri ghts groups appear to con s i der both candidate s’ po s i ti ons in making
the con tri buti on ,as a purely el ectoral stra tegy for giving would dict a te .C a m pa i gn Co n tri bu ti o n s ,Policy De ci s i o n s , and Election Ou tco m e s
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If con tri buti ons on ly ra rely affect legi s l a tor policy po s i ti on s , is it bec a u s e
the candidates alw ays adopt the vo te-maximizing policy stance s , or do can-
d i d a tes ch oose po s i ti ons based on pers onal preferen ce? The esti m a tes on
the five bi lls ex a m i n ed here leave open the latter po s s i bi l i ty. The coef f i c i en t s
on the distri ct va ri a bles are joi n t ly significant at the 1 percent level in each
of the NA F TA , F M LA , defense spen d i n g, and gun con trol policy equ a ti on s ,
and at the 5 percent level in the aborti on equ a ti on , i n d i c a ting that candi-
d a tes re s pond stron gly to vo ter preferen ce s . Even excluding the party va ri-
a bl e , h owever, pers onal ch a racteri s tics also affected candidate s’ po l i c y
s t a n ces on three of the bi ll s . The coef f i c i ents on the pers onal ch a racteri s ti c s
a re significant at the 5 percent level for the aborti on bi ll (W = 1 2 . 3 9 ) , t h e
defense spending bi ll (W = 6 . 1 3 ) , and the Brady bi ll (W = 7 . 6 8 ) . Pers on a l
ch a racteri s tics did not sign i f i c a n t ly affect the FMLA , and no pers onal ch a r-
acteri s tics other than party were inclu ded in the NA F TA equ a ti on .
Tre a ting campaign con tri buti ons as en dogenous is very important in cal-
c u l a ting the ef fect of con tri buti ons on policy po s i ti on s . Ta ble 7 com p a re s
the esti m a ted ef fect of con tri buti ons on policy po s i ti ons from Ta bles 3–6
with esti m a tes of policy equ a ti ons that treat con tri buti ons as exogen o u s .
In every case, using a mu l tiple equ a ti on sys tem to iden tify the impact of
con tri buti ons on incumben t s’ policy ch oi ces redu ces the coef f i c i ent esti-
m a te dra m a ti c a lly. In four out of f ive of the po l i c i e s , con tri buti ons appe a r
to have a high ly significant ef fect on incumben t s’policy stances in a singl e -
equ a ti on esti m a ti on . Th ree of these coef f i c i ent esti m a tes become negl i gi-
ble or nega tive in the mu l tiple equ a ti on sys tem , h owever. The ef fect of
using a mu l tiple equ a ti on sys tem on the ch a ll en ger con tri buti on coef f i-
c i ents is less cl e a r. Because PAC con tri buti ons to ch a ll en gers are less com-
m on , these esti m a tes are imprecise in the mu l tiple equ a ti on sys tem . Th e
s i n gl e - equ a ti on esti m a tes find a significant correl a ti on bet ween con tri bu-
ti ons and policy ch oi ces for two of the issues (aborti on and gun con tro l ) .
The esti m a ted impacts of con tri buti ons on ch a ll en gers’policy dec i s i ons on
these two issues are not sign i f i c a n t ly different from zero wh en con tri bu-
ti ons are tre a ted as en dogen o u s .
Com p a ring the ef fect of con tri buti ons on policy ch oi ces made by incum-
bents and by ch a ll en gers in Co lumn 1 of Ta ble 7 reveals that con tri buti on s
h ave a larger po s i tive ef fect on the policy dec i s i ons of ch a ll en gers for all
f ive issues ex a m i n ed . The esti m a te of the ef fect of con tri buti ons on ch a l-
l en ger policy stances is also po s i tive for all five bi ll s . Con tri buti ons mayt hus affect ch a ll en ger policy ch oi ce s , but the impact cannot be esti m a ted
prec i s ely en o u gh to differen ti a te it from zero because of the rel a tively small
amount of PAC mon ey flowing to ch a ll en gers
Table 7 Effect of Treating Contributions as Endogenous
Effect of Multiple Equation  Single Equation
Contributions on: Estimates Estimates
Incumbents f3
NAFTA -0.0006 0.0028 ***
FMLA -0.0031 ** 0.0013
Abortion bill -0.2328 1.2129 ***
Defense spending 0.0637 *** 0.0894 ***




Abortion bill 0.1477 0.1798 ***
Defense spending 3.2287 0.0849
Gun control 100.6938 0.1659 ***
Policy Implic ations
The re sults pre s en ted above su ggest the fo ll owing con clu s i on s . F i rs t ,
con tri buti ons have large ef fects on el ecti on outcomes on ly for ch a ll en gers .
Secon d , c a m p a i gn mon ey tends to flow to candidates who su pport the
i n terest gro u p’s favored po s i ti on ra t h er than influ encing the policy dec i-
s i ons made by the candidate s . An attem pt is now made to qu a n tify how
l a r ge  a  role  campaign  mon ey  played  in  shaping  the  House  of
Repre s en t a tives in 1997–98.
Ta ble 8 pre s ents the 1996 House of Repre s en t a tives el ecti on outcomes and
uses the esti m a ti on re sults to simu l a te the pred i cted outcomes if c a m p a i gn
f u n d - raising were rep l aced with com p l ete public funding of el ecti on s . In
the 1996 House of Repre s en t a tives el ecti on s , 207 Dem oc ra t s , 2 2 6
Rep u bl i c a n s , and 2 In depen dents won seats. In races bet ween an incum-
bent and a ch a ll en ger, 360 out of 381 incumbents (95 percent) won el ec-
ti on . Data are su f f i c i ent to pred i ct the el ecti on outcome for 364 el ecti on s
i nvo lving an incumben t , with 175 races won by Dem oc ra t s , 189 by
Rep u bl i c a n s ,and 343 by incumbents (94 percen t ) .
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A.Incumbent against Challenger Elections
Democratic  Republican Incumbent Challenger
Victories Victories Victories Victories
Outcomes 207 226 360 21
Outcomes the model can predict 175 189 343 21
Predicted outcomes
With all variables 175 189 334 30
With no incumbent contributions 179 185 334 30
With no challenger contributions 163 201 358 6





Outcomes model can predict 23 27
Predicted outcomes
With all variables 25 25
With no open-seat contributions 29 21
C.Effects of Public Funding of Elections at Various Levels
Democratic  Republican Incumbent Challenger
Victories Victories Victories Victories
Predicted outcomes at
actual 1996 funding levels 175 189 334 30
Public funding of $250,000 168 196 350 14
Public funding of $550,000 174 190 333 31
Public funding of $1,000,000 183 181 285 79
The pred i cted nu m ber of seats won by Dem oc ra t s , Rep u bl i c a n s , i n c u m-
ben t s , and ch a ll en gers under three co u n terf actuals—no campaign con-
tri buti ons received by incumben t s , ch a ll en gers , or both—is provi ded in
the bo t tom half of Ta ble 8A. The met h od used to derive these esti m a te s
is provi ded in Appendix B.
The table shows that the model pred i cts the total nu m ber of seats won by
Dem oc rats and Rep u blicans qu i te well , but it overe s ti m a tes sligh t ly the
nu m ber of seats won by ch a ll en gers . The simu l a ti ons reveal the negl i gi-
ble impact that con tri buti ons received by incumbents have on el ecti on
o utcom e s . The model pred i cts that if i n c u m bents had received no cam-
p a i gn mon ey,t h ey would sti ll have won ex act ly the same nu m ber of s e a t s
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The con tri buti ons received by ch a ll en gers , on the other hand, h ad a very
l a r ge ef fect on the outcom e s . The model pred i cts that the nu m ber of
ch a ll en gers winning el ecti on would have fall en from 30 (out of 364) to 6
i f t h ey had received no campaign mon ey. If n ei t h er incumbents nor ch a l-
l en gers had received any campaign funds, the nu m ber of ch a ll en gers that
ga i n ed seats in the House of Repre s en t a tives is esti m a ted to have fall en
f rom 30 to 7. Thu s , de s p i te the large fund-raising adva n t a ge that incum-
bents en j oy, c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons appear to help ch a ll en gers more
than incumbents because mon ey received by the form er has a large ef fect
on the el ecti on outcome while mon ey received by the latter does not.
The model also pred i cts that Dem oc rats would have lost 14 seats in the
House of Repre s en t a tives had no campaign con tri buti ons been given to
c a n d i d a te s . This re sult em er ges because there were more Dem oc ra ti c
than Rep u blican ch a ll en gers .
Ta ble 8B shows similar pred i cted ef fects of c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons on
el ecti on outcomes for the open-seat race s . Th ere were 50 open-seat race s
in 1996 that re su l ted in data su f f i c i ent for the model to pred i ct the out-
com e . The model sligh t ly overpred i cts the nu m ber of Dem oc ra tic wi n n ers
at 25, while on ly 23 Dem oc rats actu a lly won el ecti on . In open-seat race s ,
Rep u blicans appe a red to gain from campaign con tri buti on s . If n ei t h er
c a n d i d a te had received any campaign mon ey, four more Dem oc rats are
pred i cted to have won el ecti on . This re sult em er ges part ly bec a u s e
Dem oc ra tic open-seat candidates received sligh t ly more mon ey ($656,000
on avera ge) than did their Rep u blican co u n terp a rts ($640,000).
Ta ble 8C shows the impact of forcing all candidates in all House cam-
p a i gns to use on ly public funding at three different level s . Su ch a reform
would be difficult to implem ent in a con s ti tuti onal manner since the
Su preme Co u rt ru l ed in 1976 in B u ck l ey v. Va l e o that mandatory spen d i n g
limits for candidates were uncon s ti tuti onal as a vi o l a ti on of f ree speech .
The first level of p u blic funding is $250,000 for every candidate , wh i ch is
very close to the avera ge campaign recei pts of ch a ll en gers in the gen era l
el ecti on to the House of Repre s en t a tives in 1998 ($255,788). The secon d
l evel of p u blic funding ex a m i n ed is $550,000, close to the avera ge recei pt s
of a ll gen eral el ecti on House candidates in 1998 ($544,335). The impact of
providing a mu ch high er level of p u blic funding, $1 mill i on to each candi-
d a te ,is also ex a m i n ed in the tabl e .
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of p u blic funding provi ded to each candidate , the gre a ter the nu m ber
of ch a ll en gers who may be ex pected to win el ecti on . A more su rpri s i n g
re sult is that moving all candidates to the avera ge campaign financing
received by ch a ll en gers in 1996 re su l ted in a pred i cted decline of 1 6
su ccessful ch a ll en ge s . The re sult seems co u n teri n tu i tive since two -
t h i rds of the ch a ll en gers would see an increase in their con tri buti ons if
p u blic funding of $250,000 were provi ded for every gen eral el ecti on
c a n d i d a te , and 93 percent of i n c u m bents would receive less campaign
m on ey. Ch a ll en gers receiving less than $250,000 were not vi a ble candi-
d a tes in 1996, h owever, and raising their campaign funds up to that
l evel does not make them vi a ble candidate s . The lowest total of c a m-
p a i gn funds received by a ch a ll en ger who won the 1996 el ecti on was
$ 6 2 1 , 2 2 0 . The model pred i cts that raising all candidates to $250,000 in
ava i l a ble funds (but not reducing the mon ey received above that level )
would have re su l ted in a gain of on ly two ex tra seats for ch a ll en gers .
Forcing all candidates to use on ly $250,000 of p u blic mon ey wo u l d
t hus have a largely nega tive impact on the el ecti on ch a n ces of t h e
vi a ble ch a ll en gers who received con s i dera ble campaign don a ti ons wi t h-
o ut helping the el ecti on ch a n ces of the majori ty of ch a ll en gers . Even
providing public funding of $550,000—almost the avera ge of a ll gen-
eral el ecti on candidate recei pts and more than twi ce the ch a ll en gers’
avera ge recei pt s — would increase the nu m ber of el ecti ons ch a ll en gers
won by on ly one seat. Providing a very high level of p u blic funding for
House races ($1 mill i on) is esti m a ted to increase the nu m ber of ch a l-
l en gers winning el ecti on by 49.
These simu l a ti ons su ggest that because of the import a n ce of c a m p a i gn
con tri buti ons to ch a ll en gers’ el ecti on outcom e s , p u blic funding of el ec-
tions would need to be at a relatively high level (about $500,000) in order
to maintain even the current electoral challenge to incumbents. If the goal
were to increase the likelihood of challengers unseating incumbents, pub-
lic funding would need to be provided at a very high level.
These results can be stated in a different way by answering the question of
h ow mu ch ex tra mon ey ch a ll en gers would need in order to el ect on e
more challenger to office. If the goal is to raise challenger representation
in Congress, what would be the price of buying one more seat for chal-
lengers?  Using the results presented here, this paper estimates that if each
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challenger would have won election. These extra funds would have cost a
total of $ 6 , 7 7 8 , 0 4 4 . That va lue is the pri ce of buying one more seat for
challengers in the House of Representatives, and it applies equally to gov-
ernment reformers or to interest groups intent on shaping representation
in the government.
The price of electing an extra Republican challenger in 1996 would have
been slightly higher than that of electing an extra Democratic challenger.
If $5,704,860 had been spre ad even ly among the 204 Dem oc ra tic ch a l-
lengers, the predicted number winning election would have risen from 22
to 23. It would have taken an ex tra $8,535,920, s pre ad among the 160
Republican challengers, to increase the expected number winning election
f rom 8 to 9. The re a s on for this differen ce comes from the non l i n e a r
ef fect of c a m p a i gn mon ey on the prob a bi l i ty of winning el ecti on . For
c a n d i d a tes whose ex pected vo te fracti on is very low, a small increase in
contributions does not have a large impact on election probabilities. The
effect of money on election chances rises rapidly,however,as the expected
vote fraction approaches 50 percent. Democratic challengers had a much
larger expected fraction of the vote in 1996 than Republican challengers
did, and this difference is reflected in the fact that 18 Democrats defeated
Republican incumbents whereas only 3 Republican challengers won their
el ecti on s . Any ex tra mon ey received by Dem oc ra tic ch a ll en gers wo u l d
thus have had a larger impact on their election chances than equivalent
contributions received by Republican challengers.
Si n ce the esti m a ted ef fect of recei pts by Dem oc ra tic incumbents on
t h eir vo te shares is nega tive , c a l c u l a ting the ex tra mon ey that wo u l d
re sult in one more incumbent Dem oc rat being el ected (in ex pect a-
ti on) is not po s s i bl e . The pri ce of an ex tra seat for an incumben t
Rep u blican in 1996, h owever, is esti m a ted to be $98,532,000, or
$483,000 in ex tra campaign con tri buti ons distri buted even ly amon g
e ach of the 204 Rep u blican incumben t s . The gre a ter impact of ch a l-
l en ger than incumbent con tri buti ons on el ecti on outcomes is ref l ected
in the fact that the pri ce of buying an ex tra seat for a Rep u bl i c a n
i n c u m bent is abo ut 11.5 times gre a ter than the pri ce of s ec u ring an
ex tra seat for a Rep u blican ch a ll en ger.
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the five policy issu e s
Ma ny arguments for campaign finance reform focus on the exce s s ive influ-
en ce of po l i tical acti on com m i t tees on the dec i s i ons made by Con gre s s . In
f act , the ori ginal Mc Ca i n - Fei n gold campaign finance reform bi ll in Ju n e
1996 inclu ded a ban on PAC con tri buti on s . This secti on uses the em p i ri c a l
re sults pre s en ted earl i er to esti m a te the pred i cted ef fect of PAC con tri bu-
ti ons on the ex pected su pport for each of the five policy issues in the 105th
Con gre s s . These calculati ons esti m a te the ef fect that a ban on PAC con tri-
buti ons would have on ex pected su pport for the policy issu e s .
Ta ble 9A shows the actual con tri buti ons made by interest groups that had
a stake in ei t h er su pporting or opposing one of the five issues stu d i ed in
this paper. Business gro u p s , who in gen eral su pported NA F TA and
oppo s ed the Fa m i ly and Medical Le ave Act ,gave abo ut $48 mill i on to can-
d i d a tes for the 1997–98 House of Repre s en t a tive s , com p a red to labor
gro u p s’ $38 mill i on . Pro - l i fe groups (su pporting the ban on parti a l - bi rt h
a borti ons) con tri buted sligh t ly over $1 mill i on while pro - ch oi ce gro u p s
don a ted nearly $600,000. Con tri buti ons rel a ting to the last two issu e s , c ut s
in defense spending and gun con tro l , a re heavi ly ti l ted in favor of the bi ll s’
oppon en t s . The defense indu s try and gun ri ghts groups each con tri buted
well over $2 mill i on , com p a red to less than $50,000 each for pe ace gro u p s
and gun con trol advoc a te s .
In order to measu re the ef fect of the PAC con tri buti ons on the makeup of
the House of Repre s en t a tive s ,this paper uses the prob a bi l i ty that each can-
d i d a te wi ll win the el ecti on and the likel i h ood that he wi ll su pport the bi ll
u n der con s i dera ti on to calculate the ex pected su pport and oppo s i ti on to
e ach bi ll . The previous material discusses the prob a bi l i ty, b a s ed on the
el ecti on esti m a tes in Ta ble 1, that a candidate wi ll win el ecti on to of f i ce .
The prob a bi l i ty that a candidate su pports a specific policy issue is direct ly
e s ti m a ted for each of the five policy issues in Ta bles 3–6. The ex pected
nu m bers of su pporters and oppon ents in the House of Repre s en t a tives for
that specific policy issue are provi ded in Ta ble 9A. (The met h ods used to
produ ce the esti m a tes in Ta ble 9 are provi ded in Appendix C.)
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A.Contributions and Expected Support for Each Bill 
in the 105th House of Representatives
Family  B-2 
NAFTA Leave Act Abortion Bombers Brady
Total con tri buti ons 
in su pport
1 $ 4 8 , 1 2 5 , 5 2 8 $ 3 7 , 6 1 0 , 8 8 1 $ 1 , 0 3 4 , 6 1 7 $ 4 8 , 8 7 6 $ 3 7 , 1 7 7
Total con tri buti ons 
in oppo s i ti on
1 $ 3 8 , 1 3 0 , 6 8 7 $ 4 7 , 9 4 4 , 8 7 8 $ 5 8 2 , 0 6 0 $ 2 , 1 9 0 , 0 6 8 $ 2 , 4 5 8 , 7 6 9
Pred i cted su pporters 2 0 3 2 3 5 2 5 0 1 8 6 1 9 8
Pred i cted oppon en t s 2 1 1 1 7 6 1 6 1 2 1 5 2 0 3
B.Effects of PAC Contributions on the Expected Support for Each Issue
2
With No  With No  With No 
Con tri buti on s Con tri buti on s Con tri buti ons in Favor
in Su pport ofBi ll Oppo s ed to Bi ll of or Oppo s ed to Bi ll
NAFTA support
Influence effect only 201 / 213 219 / 196 214 / 200
Electoral effect only 202 / 212 206 / 208 205 / 209
Total effect 200 / 214 220 / 194 215 / 199
FMLA support
Influence effect only 237 / 175 220 / 192 221 / 190
Electoral effect only 232 / 180 237 / 175 233 / 179
Total effect 233 / 178 221 / 190 218 / 193
Abortion bill support
Influence effect only 261 / 151 244 / 168 254 / 157
Electoral effect only 250 / 162 250 / 161 250 / 162
Total effect 261 / 151 244 / 168 254 / 157
B-2 bomber cuts support
Influence effect only 181 / 220 230 / 171 227 / 174
Electoral effect only 186 / 215 186 / 215 186 / 215
Total effect 181 / 220 230 / 171 227 / 174
Brady bill support
Influence effect only 196 / 205 222 / 179 220 / 181
Electoral effect only 198 / 203 198 / 203 198 / 203
Total effect 196 / 205 222 / 179 220 / 181
1 These rows include only contributions to those candidates for whom probabilities of election and of
supporting the bill in question can be predicted.
2 The table shows the ex pected nu m ber of su pporters for the bi ll / ex pected nu m ber of oppon ents for the bi ll .
NA F TA was ex pected to have sligh t ly more oppon ents (211) than su pporters
(203) in the 105th Ho u s e , while the FMLA was ex pected to have con s i der-
a bly more su pporters (235) than oppon ents (176). The ban on parti a l - bi rt h
a borti on en j oyed the stron gest ex pected su pport (250 su pporters and on ly
161 oppon en t s ) , while cuts in spending on B-2 bom bers were pred i cted to
fail in a vo te by 186–215. The Brady gun con trol bi ll had a nearly even split,
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and su pporters for each bi ll do not add up to the total nu m ber of s e a t s
because missing data preclu des the calculati on of prob a bi l i ties for some of
the candidate s . Non et h el e s s , data are su f f i c i ent to pred i ct the po s i ti ons of
m ore than 400 of the 435 seats for all five bi ll s .
Ta ble 9B pre s ents the influ en ce , el ectora l , and total ef fects of PAC con tri bu-
ti ons on the overa ll House stance for each of the five issues ex a m i n ed in this
p a per. Th ree different co u n terf actuals are con s i dered . In the firs t , i n tere s t
group con tri buti ons against the bi ll remain at their actual levels while con-
tri buti ons in favor of the bi ll are set to zero. The second co u n terf actual set s
on ly con tri buti ons against the bi ll to zero, while the third assumes that nei-
t h er interest groups su pporting nor those opposing the bi ll gave any mon ey
to candidate s .
The ef fects of business con tri buti ons on the ex pected su pport for NA F TA
a re very small .Wi t h o ut any mon ey from business gro u p s ,the ex pected su p-
port for NA F TA falls by on ly three seats overa ll , t wo - t h i rds of wh i ch com e
t h ro u gh the influ en ce ef fect . L a bor group con tri buti on s , on the other hand,
h ave a large ef fect on the pred i cted su pport for NA F TA .Wi t h o ut any mon ey
f rom or ga n i zed labor, 220 repre s en t a tives were pred i cted to have favored
NA F TA , com p a red to on ly 203 repre s en t a tives who were ex pected to su p-
port NA F TA after receiving labor con tri buti on s .Almost all of the impact of
the labor con tri buti ons is due to the mon ey influ encing the prob a bi l i ty that
c a n d i d a tes would su pport NA F TA ra t h er than affecting wh i ch candidate s
won el ecti on .The overa ll ef fect of the interest group mon ey is to redu ce su p-
port for NA F TA from 215 su pporters (and 199 oppon ents) to on ly 203 su p-
porters (and 211 oppon en t s ) .
Su rpri s i n gly, l a bor groups have a gre a ter ef fect on the makeup of Con gre s s
on this issue de s p i te the larger sums given by business gro u p s . The re a s on
for this seeming paradox is that labor groups gave mu ch more mon ey to
ch a ll en gers than did business gro u p s .L a bor groups gave more than $17 mil-
l i on to ch a ll en gers and open-seat candidates com p a red to on ly sligh t ly more
than $6 mill i on from business gro u p s .Because con tri buti ons to incumben t s
h ad a negl i gi ble impact on these candidate s’ NA F TA policy po s i ti ons and
el ecti on ch a n ces while con tri buti ons to ch a ll en gers or open-seat candidate s
h ad a larger ef fect on their po s i ti ons and ch a n ce s ,the labor stra tegy paid of f
in terms of reducing su pport for NA F TA in the House of Repre s en t a tive s .
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con tri buti ons had a larger impact on the prob a bi l i ty of a repre s en t a tive vo t-
ing for the NA F TA bi ll in 1993 than did business con tri buti on s .Some of t h e
adva n t a ge of l a bor groups in lobbying over this issue is that they cl e a rly
p l ace a gre a ter em phasis on defe a ting NA F TA than business groups do in
su pporting it.
The import a n ce of PAC con tri buti ons in reducing su pport for NA F TA may
h ave had a lon g - term ef fect on U. S . trade policy in North and So ut h
Am eri c a .In 1997 and 1998 Pre s i dent Bi ll Cl i n ton attem pted to get fast-track
n ego ti a ting aut h ori ty to ex tend NA F TA to inclu de Chile (and po ten ti a lly
o t h er We s tern Hem i s ph ere co u n tries) in an ex p a n ded free trade are a . Th e
bi ll never ga i n ed en o u gh su pport to be bro u ght to a vo te in 1997, h owever,
and was defe a ted 180–243 in the House of Repre s en t a tives in 1998. Ba l dwi n
and Ma gee (2000a) discuss the determinants of the 1998 House vo te and the
role that labor con tri buti ons played in its defe a t .
As with NA F TA , t h ere are small (2–3 vo te) ch a n ges in ex pected su pport for
the FMLA due to the el ectoral ef fect of business and labor group con tri bu-
ti on s . The influ en ce ef fect of con tri buti ons is actu a lly perverse in this case
because of the nega tive coef f i c i ent esti m a te on incumbent con tri buti ons in
t a ble 3B. Thu s , m on ey from business groups appe a rs to influ en ce incum-
bents to su pport the FMLA , and mon ey from labor groups influ en ces them
to oppose it.The overa ll ef fect of m on ey from both business and labor PAC s
raises su pport for the FMLA from an ex pected 218 vo tes wi t h o ut any con tri-
buti ons to an ex pected 235 su pporters with con tri buti on s .
The ex pected su pport for the aborti on , defense spen d i n g, and gun con tro l
bi lls is not altered by the el ectoral ef fect of PAC don a ti on s . In each case, t h e
total con tri buti ons from PACs intere s ted in the outcome of the measu res was
less than $3 mill i on , so the don a ti ons had on ly a negl i gi ble impact on the
el ecti on outcom e s . The influ en ce ef fects of PAC con tri buti ons on the latter
t wo bi lls tu rn out to be qu i te large ,h owever.Con s i der a bi ll cut ting spen d i n g
for B-2 bom bers .In the absen ce of con tri buti ons from pe ace gro u p s ,it is esti-
m a ted that five fewer repre s en t a tives would have su pported the cuts (181
su pporters wi t h o ut the pe ace group con tri buti ons and 186 su pporters wi t h
those con tri buti on s ) .In the absen ce of defense indu s try lobbying against the
c ut s , it is esti m a ted that 44 more repre s en t a tives would have su pported the
bi ll (230 su pporters wi t h o ut the defense con tri buti ons and 186 with them ) .
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su pport for the bi ll from 227 repre s en t a tives (easily en o u gh to pass the cut s )
to 186 (wh i ch would be ro u n dly defe a ted by oppon en t s ) .
The lobbying over gun con trol repre s ents a similar story, of a bi ll that wo u l d
h ave been ex pected to pass wi t h o ut any con tri buti on s ,wh i ch was defe a ted in
the pre s en ce of those con tri buti on s .With con tri buti ons from both su pport-
ers and oppon ents of the Brady bi ll , the ex pected makeup of the House of
Repre s en t a tives inclu ded 198 su pporters and 203 oppon ents of gun con tro l .
The small amount of m on ey given by gun con trol groups had ra i s ed su p-
port for the measu re from 196 to 198 (en ti rely thro u gh the influ en ce ef fect ) .
The mu ch larger don a ti ons of gun ri ghts groups redu ced the ex pected su p-
port from 222 mem bers (in the absen ce of gun ri ghts con tri buti ons) to 198
repre s en t a tives (after those con tri buti ons were made ) .
Thu s , for three of the policy issues ex a m i n ed (NA F TA , B-2 bom ber spen d-
ing cut s , and gun con tro l ) , the PAC con tri buti ons were dec i s ive in tu rning 
a bi ll ’s ex pected passage in the House into its pred i cted defe a t . These re su l t s
should be interpreted with cauti on , h owever, s i n ce they depend on large 
but imprec i s ely esti m a ted coef f i c i ents for the ef fect of con tri buti ons on 
ch a ll en gers’ policies rega rding defense spending and gun con tro l .
Non et h el e s s , the re sults su ggest that PACs can have large impacts on the
types of policies that em er ge from Con gre s s .
C onclusions
The em p i rical esti m a tes pre s en ted in this paper su ggest the fo ll owi n g
con clu s i on s . F i rs t , the em p i rical re sults here do not solve the puzzle of
why PACs give the predominant share of t h eir mon ey to incumben t s
ra t h er than to ch a ll en gers . Con tri buti ons to ch a ll en gers not on ly have
a gre a ter impact on el ecti on s , but also a larger po s i tive impact on po l-
icy dec i s i ons for all five of the policy issues ex a m i n ed here .
Con tri buti ons to incumben t s , on the other hand, h ave a negl i gi bl e
i m p act on el ecti on outcomes and on policy dec i s i ons for all of t h e
i s sues except defense spen d i n g.
Why do PACs give to incumbents if t h eir mon ey does not influ en ce
ei t h er policy ch oi ces or el ecti on outcomes? Most likely in an ef fort to buy
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with that hypothesis is that business groups gave more mon ey to mem-
bers of the Ways and Means and Com m erce Com m i t tee s , l a bor gro u p s
t a r geted con tri buti ons to mem bers of the Edu c a ti on and Labor
Com m i t tee , and defense PACs heavi ly su pported mem bers of t h e
Na ti onal Sec u ri ty Com m i t tee .
A second con clu s i on is that con tri buti ons received by ch a ll en gers and
open-seat candidates appear to have a mu ch larger ef fect on el ecti on
o utcomes than do con tri buti ons received by incumben t s . The po l i c y
i m p l i c a ti on of this re su l t , as shown in Ta ble 8, is that any attem pt to
limit spending in el ecti on outcomes to some spec i f i ed amount of p u bl i c
funding would likely favor incumbents and hu rt ch a ll en gers unless the
s pending limit were set at a very high level — m ore than $500,000 
per candidate in order to maintain the current ex pected nu m ber of
ch a ll en gers winning el ecti on .
A campaign policy reform that el i m i n a ted PAC con tri buti ons wi t h o ut
rep l acing them with public funding would have little impact on el ecti on
o utcomes since most PAC mon ey goes to incumben t s . Su ch a reform
m i ght have important ef fects on the policies em er ging from Con gre s s ,
h owever. The simu l a ti ons in Ta ble 9 indicate that el i m i n a ting PAC con tri-
buti ons would have re su l ted in ex pected majori ty House su pport for
NA F TA , c uts in defense spen d i n g, and gun con tro l . In s te ad a majori ty of
repre s en t a tives were ex pected to oppose all three of these bi lls after receiv-
ing PAC con tri buti on s .Thu s ,PAC mon ey appe a red to be dec i s ive on these
i s su e s . That is the great fear of c a m p a i gn finance reform ers—that intere s t
groups wi eld exce s s ive power in the legi s l a tive proce s s . The re sults in this
p a per give that fear some su pport , a l t h o u gh it is ten t a tive su pport bec a u s e
of the difficulty of m e a su ring prec i s ely the impact of con tri buti ons on 
policy ch oi ce s . In the ti m e - h on ored trad i ti on of econ omists wishing to
c re a te futu re demand for their servi ce s ,I end with the com m ent that more
re s e a rch needs to be done on this issu e .
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1 . A su m m a ry of the Mc Ca i n - Fei n go l d - Coch ran bi ll is ava i l a ble at
w w w. S tra i gh t Ta l k Am eri c a . com
2 . For furt h er inve s ti ga ti on of these issu e s ,s ee Ma gee (2001).
3 . Wh en the sys tem is esti m a ted using two - s t a ge least squ a re s , the coef f i-
c i ent becomes insign i f i c a n t ly po s i tive .
4 . Poor instru m ents used to iden tify the el ecti on outcome equ a ti on are
not to blame for the insignificant coef f i c i ent on incumbent con tri bu-
ti on s . The vectors of coef f i c i ents of the ei ght instru m ental va ri a bles in
the con tri buti on equ a ti ons have Wald stati s tics bet ween 268 and 273,
and they are both stati s ti c a lly significant at the 1 percent level .
5 . Al t h o u gh they are not reported in the tabl e s , ex ten s ive sen s i tivi ty
a n a lyses have been perform ed on the ef fects of om i t ting va ri a bl e s
from the regressions.Magee (2001) reports the estimates under alter-
native specifications of the model; these results are available from the
author upon request. The sensitivity tests show that the small impact
of contributions on the NAFTA decision and the surprisingly nega-
tive effect of contributions on the FMLA policy choice are robust to
changes in the variables that are included in the model. The estimates
a re also ch ecked for their robu s tness to the exclu s i on of o ut l i ers
(defined as the five candidates receiving the most money from labor
or business groups) and to the estimation technique.
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In order to sep a ra te out the ef fect of con tri buti ons on el ecti on outcom e s
f rom the ef fect of ex pected outcomes on con tri buti on s , the fo ll owing 
s ys tem of equ a ti ons is esti m a ted .
1 . vo te sD = F(a0 + a1X + ID( a2CD+ a3CR) + IR( a4CD+ a5CR) + 
( 1 - ID) (1-IR) ( a6CD+ a7CR)) + e1
2 . CD = b0 + b1Y + b2E ( vo te sD) + b3CR + e2
3 . CR= d0 + d1Z + d2E ( vo te sD) + d3CD + e3
wh ere CD and CR a re the campaign con tri buti ons received by
Dem oc rats and Rep u bl i c a n s , E ( vo te sD) is the ex pected  percen t a ge of
the popular vo te received by the Dem oc ra t , F is the cumu l a tive stan-
d a rd normal distri buti on , ID ( IR) is a du m my va ri a ble that equals one if
the Dem oc rat (Rep u blican) is an incumben t , and X, Y, and Z are vec-
tors of exogenous ex p l a n a tory va ri a bl e s . Si n ce the vo tes va ri a ble is
bo u n ded bet ween zero and on e , equ a ti on 1 is spec i f i ed non l i n e a rly
(using the standard normal cumu l a tive distri buti on functi on) in su ch a
w ay that the outp ut is re s tri cted to bet ween zero and on e . In the esti-
m a ti on , the ex pected vo ting outcome is equal to the pred i cted outcom e
given by the ri ght-hand side of equ a ti on 1. The esti m a tes of a2 and a5
reveal the ef fect of i n c u m bent recei pts by Dem oc rats and Rep u bl i c a n s
on the el ecti on outcom e . The esti m a tes of a3 and a4 a re def i n ed simi-
l a rly for ch a ll en gers , and a6 and a7 s h ow the impacts of con tri buti on s
on open-seat el ecti on s . These equ a ti ons are esti m a ted using con tri bu-
ti ons received by candidates ra t h er than their campaign ex pen d i tu re s .
Recei pts and ex pen d i tu res are high ly correl a ted (correl a ti on = 0.96),
h owever, and using ex pen d i tu res does not ch a n ge the re su l t s . The coef-
f i c i ents b2 and d2 e s ti m a te how campaign recei pts re s pond to the
ex pected vo ting outcom e , and b3 and d3 reveal the ex tent to wh i ch the
c a n d i d a tes alter their fund-raising in re s ponse to the con tri buti on s
ra i s ed by their oppon en t . The sys tem of equ a ti ons is esti m a ted by full -
i n form a ti on maximum likel i h ood .
The esti m a tes in equ a ti on 1 yi eld a pred i cted vo te share for the incumben t
while equ a ti ons 2 and 3 determine the pred i cted con tri buti ons received by
e ach candidate . In a simu l t a n eous equ a ti on model , certain exclu s i on
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the con tri buti on equ a ti ons but inclu ded in equ a ti on 1 is the margin of vi c-
tory in the con gre s s i onal distri ct by the pre s i den tial candidate from the
i n c u m ben t’s party. This va ri a ble ref l ects the party strength of the incum-
bent repre s en t a tive in the distri ct , but it should not direct ly affect the con-
tri buti ons he or she receive s . Exclu ded from equ a ti on 1 are du m my
va ri a bles indicating if the incumbent was the chair or ranking mem ber of
a com m i t tee or on the Ways and Means Com m i t tee in 1994–95, a ge ,
regi onal du m my va ri a bl e s , the incumben t’s campaign recei pts in the 1994
el ecti on cycl e ,and wh et h er or not the candidate was invo lved in a pri m a ry.
E ach of these va ri a bles affects the candidate’s abi l i ty or incl i n a ti on to
amass con tri buti ons wi t h o ut direct ly affecting his or her ch a n ces of
su ccess in the el ecti on .
The sys tem of equ a ti ons esti m a ted is:
4 . Pj m = F(f0 + f1Xd + f2Xpm + f3Im( Cj m- C( - j ) m) + 
f4( 1 - Im) ( Cj m- C( - j ) m)) + e4
5 . Cj m = g0 + g1Ypm + g2Pj m + g3Pj ( - m ) + e5
6 . C( - j ) m = h0 + h1Zpm + h2Pj m + h3Pj ( - m ) + e6
where Pjm=1 if candidate m supports policy j, F is the cumulative stan-
d a rd normal distri buti on , Xd is a vector of d i s tri ct ch a racteri s ti c s , Xpm,
Ypm, and Zpm are personal characteristics of candidate m, Cjm (C(-j)m) are
the con tri buti ons that candidate m receives from groups who su pport
(oppose) policy j, and Pj(-m) is the policy decision of the opposing candi-
d a te . The coef f i c i en t s f3 and f4 reveal the ef fects of c a m p a i gn con tri bu-
ti ons on the policy stances adopted by incumbents and ch a ll en gers ,
respectively. Magee (2001) estimates a similar set of equations but finds
the ef fect of c a m p a i gn con tri buti ons on policy ch oi ces to be iden ti c a l
between incumbents and challengers.
Equ a ti ons 5 and 6 esti m a te the campaign con tri buti ons a candidate
receives from po l i tical acti on com m i t tees for and against each po l i c y
s t a n ce . PAC indepen dent ex pen d i tu res against a candidate are co u n ted 
as nega tive con tri buti on s , so that the depen dent va ri a bles in equ a ti ons 5
and 6 are not bo u n ded by zero. The con tri buti ons are determ i n ed by the
pers onal ch a racteri s tics of the candidate as well as the policy stance
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m o tive in making campaign don a ti on s , t h en there wi ll be po s i tive coef f i-
c i ent esti m a tes of g2 and h3 and nega tive esti m a tes of g3 and h2. Su pport
for a PAC ’s preferred policy stance (and oppo s i ti on to that stance by the
c a n d i d a te’s el ectoral oppon ent) should lead to gre a ter campaign con tri bu-
ti ons from the PAC . Because of the difficulty in attaining conver gen ce of
the para m eters using full - i n form a ti on maximum likel i h ood , the sys tem is
e s ti m a ted by gen era l i zed met h od of m om en t s .Sen s i tivi ty analyses are per-
form ed on the esti m a ti on tech n i qu e , the inclu s i on of o ut l i ers , and the
va ri a bles inclu ded in the model .
Appendix B
The regre s s i on esti m a tes in Ta ble 1 gen era te a pred i cted vo te share for
the Dem oc ra tic candidate . The full - i n form a ti on maximum likel i h ood
e s ti m a ti on perform ed assumes that the re s i duals are distri buted 
n orm a lly. That assu m pti on can be used to tra n s form the pred i cted
Dem oc ra tic vo te share into a pred i cted prob a bi l i ty the Dem oc rat wi ll
win the el ecti on . The calculati ons are com p l i c a ted sligh t ly by the fact
that third - p a rty candidates gain vo tes in many distri ct s . The Dem oc ra t
wi ll win the el ecti on if he or she receives more than half of the vo te s
going to the two major party candidate s , or if
vo te sD > x = (1 - vo te s3) / 2 , wh ere vo te sD = Dem oc ra t’s vo te share
vo te s3 = third - p a rty candidate s’ vo te share ,a n d
x = the vo te share nece s s a ry for vi ctory.
The prob a bi l i ty of the Dem oc rat winning is 
pD= Pr ( E ( vo te sD) + e1 > x) = Pr (e1 > x - E(vo te sD)) F((e(vo te sD) - x)/s )
wh ere F is the cumu l a tive standard normal distri buti ons and s is the
s t a n d a rd devi a ti on of the re s i dual e1. E ( vo tesD) is the pred i cted
Dem oc ra tic vo te share from equ a ti on 1. Su b s ti tuting in a va lue of zero
for incumbent con tri buti on recei pts (or ch a ll en ger recei pt s , or bo t h )
a ll ows the prob a bi l i ty of vi ctory to be calculated under a co u n terf ac-
tual  of no  campaign  con tri buti ons  received  by  incumben t s ,
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Dem oc rats (Rep u bl i c a n s , i n c u m ben t s , ch a ll en gers) re sults in the 
pred i cted nu m ber of vi ctories for Dem oc rats (Rep u bl i c a n s , i n c u m-
ben t s , ch a ll en gers ) . The ex pected nu m ber of vi ctories can also be 
c a l c u l a ted for the three co u n terf actu a l s . The pred i cted nu m ber of s e a t s
won by each group under the va rious co u n terf actuals is inclu ded in
the bo t tom half of Ta ble 8A.
Appendix C
The ex pected nu m ber of su pporters and oppon ents in the House of
Repre s en t a tives for policy issue j are :
7 . E ( su ppj) = SpmPj m a n d E ( oppj) = Spm(1 - Pj m)
wh ere pm=the prob a bi l i ty,b a s ed on esti m a tes in Ta ble 1, that candidate m
wi ll win el ecti on to of f i ce , and Pj m is the prob a bi l i ty that candidate m su p-
ports policy issue j.
As discussed earl i er, PAC con tri buti ons can affect the ex pected su pport for
the bi lls in two ways . F i rs t , the mon ey can affect the prob a bi l i ty that a 
c a n d i d a te wins the el ecti on . With no mon ey from the particular intere s t
gro u p, the candidate’s prob a bi l i ty of winning the el ecti on would be p’m.
Con s i dering on ly the el ectoral ef fect of the PAC mon ey, the ex pected su p-
port and oppo s i ti on for bi ll j in the House of Repre s en t a tives in the
a b s en ce of the interest gro u p’s con tri buti ons would be :
8 . E ( su ppj
no C,E) =S p’mPj m and     E( oppj
no C,E) =Sp’m(1 - Pj m)
The total el ectoral ef fect of the interest gro u p’s mon ey on the ex pected
House of Repre s en t a tives su pport for bi ll j is E( su ppj) - E( su ppj
n o C , E) .
Secon d , the interest gro u p’s mon ey can influ en ce the likel i h ood of a candi-
d a te’s su pport for a bi ll .If the PAC had given no mon ey to candidate m,h er
l i kel i h ood of su pporting bi ll j would be P’j m. If PAC con tri buti ons had on ly
an influ en ce ef fect on candidate s , the ex pected su pport and oppo s i ti on for
the bi ll in the House in the absen ce of the gro u p’s don a ti ons would be :
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no C,I) = SpmP ’j m and     E ( oppj
no C,I) = Spm( 1 - P ’j m)
The influ en ce ef fect of the interest gro u p’s mon ey on the ex pected Ho u s e
of Repre s en t a tives su pport for bi ll j is then E( su ppj) - E( su ppj
n o C , I) . Th e
total impact of PAC con tri buti ons on ex pected su pport for each bi ll
i n clu des both the influ en ce and el ectoral ef fect s , of co u rs e . Taking both of
these ef fects into con s i dera ti on ,the pred i cted su pport for bi ll j in the 105th
House of Repre s en t a tives in the absen ce of the interest gro u p’s campaign
con tri buti ons is:
1 0 . E ( su ppj
no C) = Sp’mP ’j m and     E ( oppj
no C) = S p’m(1 - P’j m)
The differen ce bet ween the pred i cted su pport with the PAC ’s con tri buti on s
and su pport wi t h o ut its con tri buti on s , E ( su ppj) – (E(su ppj
n o C) , provi des a
m e a su re of its total impact on the House po s i ti on rega rding the bi ll .
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